

wherever there is strict justice, there is no charity, and wherever there is charity, there is no strict justice? Rather, which justice *has within it* charity? You must say, 'This is ביצוע, mediation.'" According to R' Eliezer, why was Avraham praised for commanding his children to do מִשְׁפָּט וְצִדְקָה וְדִין-צִדְקָה? Rav Meir Simcha answers that R' Eliezer's position applies only to Jewish courts. There he believes יָקוּב הַדִּין אֶת הָהָר - unless the Jewish court, for whatever reason, cannot reach a conclusion or, it is a מְרוֹמָה, the judge deduces from the witnesses' words that their testimony is untrue-in these situations, ביצוע/פְּשָׁרָה is permitted. A non-Jewish court should judge based on moral, ethical and logical precepts and if they do so, as Rav Meir Simcha puts it, מוֹתֵר וּמִצְוָה לְפֶשֶׁר אֶפְלוּ אִם יוֹדֵעַ הַדִּין שְׁלָהֶם. Returning to his original "issue"-the reversed מִשְׁפָּט וְצִדְקָה by Dovid HaMelech, Rav Meir Simcha explains that Avraham at this point, before Matan Torah, was halachically a Noahide. His civil law should emphasize שְׁמוּאֵל ב' ח' טו, the pasuk is describing Dovid HaMelech's court, a Jewish Court-where ביצוע/פְּשָׁרָה is a fallback position for exceptional circumstances only-that is why מִשְׁפָּט וְצִדְקָה i.e., first וַיְהִי דָוִד עוֹשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט וְצִדְקָה and מִשְׁפָּט only when יָקוּב הַדִּין אֶת הָהָר is not possible.

Next, he takes us to Ramban, who later, in פרק לד' יג, says: "In the Talmud Yerushalmi they discuss the law of דִּינִין ...With regards to Jewish courts, the rule is that from any case about which שְׁאֵתָהּ שְׁלָם מִמֶּנּוּ i.e., you clearly know what the ruling should be, you are 'not permitted to flee,' but שְׁאֵי אֵתָהּ שְׁלָם מִמֶּנּוּ i.e., if you have, for whatever reason, not reached a conclusion regarding the litigants' claims, 'you are permitted to flee.' With regards to the Torah law pertaining to non-Jewish courts, even when שְׁלָם מִמֶּנּוּ, 'you are permitted to flee from it.'" Rav Meir Simcha tells us that we do not have this Yerushalmi in our texts, and although Ramban may understand it differently, he feels that this "phantom" Yerushalmi is agreeing with *him* i.e., in Jewish courts, only when שְׁלָם מִמֶּנּוּ is אֵי אֵתָהּ שְׁלָם מִמֶּנּוּ permitted. In Noahide courts, even if ביצוע/פְּשָׁרָה, אֵתָהּ שְׁלָם מִמֶּנּוּ is permitted!

Finally, Rav Meir Simcha refers us to סנהדרין נד, which discusses a woman's role in the Noahide judicial process. Rav Hamnuna raises an objection to the statement that a Noahide cannot be judged by a woman: "But isn't it written with regard to Avraham, who at that point had the status of a Noahide, לַעֲשׂוֹת צִדְקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט ... לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר יֵצֵא אֶת בְּנָיו וְאֶת בִּיתוֹ אַחֲרָיו - the word בִּיתוֹ is referring to women i.e., that they were also commanded to execute מִשְׁפָּט וְצִדְקָה?" R' Hamnuna answers that בְּנָיו לְדִין, בִּיתוֹ לַעֲדָקָה. According to Rashi's earlier explanation of צִדְקָה as פְּשָׁרָה this is very מִתְאִים, for although a woman cannot adjudicate in a Noahide court i.e., בְּנָיו לְדִין, Rav Meir Simcha tells us, she may mediate a compromise settlement, לַעֲדָקָה! צִדְקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט-פְּשָׁרָה וְדִין.

לזכר נשמת אבי מורי ר' ישראל מנחם בן ר' שלום ז"ל
 לזכר נשמת אמי מורתי רחל בת ר' אלחנן אביגדור ע"ה
 לזכר נשמת חמי מורי ר' יעקב נתן בן ר' ישראל שלמה ז"ל
 ולזכר נשמת הרב יהודה בן ר' אברהם שמחה (קופרמן) זצ"ל
 מחבר הגהות על ספר משך חכמה